Lying-Lawyers

Vote Lawyers Out of Executive,Legislative Offices

2011-06-15T09:46:00.000-07:00

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-preview.aspx?doc_id=81775576

Excise the Bar and Its Members from Government

Description

Bob Hurt presents the reasons to excise the bar and its members from government, and proposes a legislation plan to accomplish it and thereby reduce corruption of lawyers and judges.

Shared by: Bob Hurt

Stats

views:: 26
posted:: 6/15/2011
language:: English
pages:: 2

Public Domain

FredGrittnerClerkMNCourts_Title18Complaint v. Sharon4Anderson

2011-05-31T08:59:00.000-07:00

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Fred: Please send SCAP Members in pdf format, Further Affiant must register a Complaint against the 2nd Judicial Dist. efile that discriminates against the taxpayers_nonlawyers_Attorney Pro Se's et al.<BR><BR>Please provide the Webmaster and or the Contract with Tyler Tech.<BR><BR>FURTHER Affiant sayeth not at this time www.lying-lawyers.blogspot.com to illegally use the Power of the Forensic Files on the Internet to deny "due process" to the Taxpaying Public is Pervase/Fatal

MNCourts_Efile_Discrimination_Sharon4Anderson_AttorneyProSe

2011-05-31T08:42:00.000-07:00

Chat session started at 10:33:51 AM
Please be patient while you are being connected with an operator ...
You are now chatting with Chris
Chris : Welcome to State of Minnesota - 2nd Judicial District, E-filing Pilot, how may I help You today?
You: Please take legal notice that the Blatant, Repugnant, Discrimination against Non Lawyers Attorney Pro Se's must be addressed Taxaction without Representation further www.taxthemax.blogspot.com www.lying-lawyers.blogspot.com Published In re: Scarrella4Justice 221NW2nd562 Unconstitutional Publication withou Royalitys Chris Please put in Forensic Fil

Serve

Expansion Annoucement: As of Monday, April 4^th, the Second Judicial District began accepting e-filed documents for the first phase of the e-File & Serve initiative. On Monday, May 23rd, all law firms and agencies are invited to begin electronically filing on all civil cases. New case types eligible to be electronically filed include implied consent cases as well as all other "minor" civil cases types. This includes new case initiation as well as subsequent documents in previously filed cases.

Start using e-File & Serve (for Law Firms ONLY)

Effective Monday, April 18th, the Second Judicial District welcomes all law firms and attorneys to begin e-filing. To start the process: 1) Please choose a firm adminstrator (Administrator Duties document) 2) The firm administrator should watch the training videos. 3) Then, contact the court via email or chat to get registered.

e-Service (for Law Firms ONLY)

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Trilogy Impeachments Judges,Public Officials 1992 to 2009

2011-05-16T08:34:00.000-07:00

California Court Management System Takes More Heat

2011-02-09T04:23:00.000-08:00

California Court Management System Takes More Heat

2011-01-31T11:36:00.001-08:00

Judge kathleengearin complaint31jan2011

View more documents from Sharon Anderson.

MN_JudgeKathleenGearin_Conflicts

2011-01-31T10:19:00.000-08:00

From: Sharon4Anderson@aol.com
To: fred.grittner@courts.state.mn.us, judicial.standards@state.mn.us, lorie.skjerven.gildea@courts.state.mn.us, kyle.christopher@courts.state.mn.us, john.scanlon@state.mn.us, martin.cole@state.mn.us, contact@justiceforbarbara.com, matt.bostrom@co.ramsey.mn.us, tom.smith@ci.stpaul.mn.us
CC: askdoj@usdoj.gov, b.todd.jones@usdoj.gov, Sharon4Anderson@aol.com, nancylazaryan@yahoo.com, kaardal@mklaw.com, DMashak@aol.com, owings1064@hotmail.com, harold@theminnesotawatchdog.com, a_democracy@yahoo.com, whistleblower@startribune.com, watchdog@pioneerpress.com
Sent: 1/31/2011 11:43:55 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: LLA_ MS609 v.Judge KathleenGearin_AaronFosterPattyBruce,GearinSharonAnderson

31Jan2011

IN THE MATTER OF 2ND JUDICIAL JUDGE KATHLEEN GEARIN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
Chief Justice Lorie Skjerven Gildea RE: MS 2.724
To the Above Named: Chief Justice MN Lorie Gildea by and thro Clerk fred.grittner@courts.state.mn.us www.mncourts.gov Phone: (651) 297-7650

Board on Judicial Standards www.bjs.state.mn.us
2025 Centre Pointe Blvd.Suite 180 Mendota Heights, MN 55120
Telephone - (651) 296-3999 Fax (651) 688-1865
TTY - use the State Relay service: call toll-free, 1-800-627-3529
E-mail - judicial.standards@state.mn.us
Chairperson
William J. Egan - Attorney member
Edina

Honorable Shaun R. Floerke - Judge member
Judge of District Court
Duluth
Douglas A. Fuller- Public member
Bemidji
Honorable Jill Flaskamp Halbrooks - Judge member
Court of Appeals
St. Paul

Jon M. Hopeman- Attorney member
Minneapolis
Cynthia C. Jepsen - Public member
Marine St. Croix
Honorable Vicki E. Landwehr - Judge member
Judge of District Court
St. Cloud
Honorable Daniel H. Mabley - Judge member
Judge of District Court
Minneapolis
Patrick D. Sexton - Public member
Edina
Randy R. Staver - Public member
Rochester
Executive Secretary
David S. Paull
Suite 180
2025 Centre Pointe Blvd.
Mendota Heights, MN 55120
Executive Assistant
Deborah Flanagan
To www.cfboard.state.mn.us Chair John Scanlon Assist Gen.Counsel 4 3M,former law clerk 4 Fed.Judge Magnuson,ie Dorsey Whitney etc.

To: www.lprb.mncourts.gov
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Pages/LawyersBoardDirectory.aspx
Martin A. Cole Director
Patrick R. Burns First Assistant Director 1500 Landmark Towers 345 St.Petr St.St.Paul,MN 55102-1218 651-296-3952 1-800-657-3601
IN THE MATTER OF CHIEF JUSTICE KATHLEEN GEARIN'S HEINOUS CONFLICTS
FURTHER AFFIANT SHARON SCARRELLA ANDERSON AKA PETERSON
IS CHARGING SAID JUDGE WITH CONSPIRACY, CREATING DEATH,DISABILITY,DISPARAGMENT OF TITLES
BY HER SECRET COURT EMPLOYMENT ON THE
SCAP IE: COMMITTMENT PANELS. TRIGGERING THE
MURDER OF SHARON'S 2ND HUSBAND CPL JIM R. ANDERSON 21SEPT2000.
Further Issues as below: re: Aaron Foster Expungment_ Conflicts former County Attorney re: Greenley and Winn Murders______ www.minnesota-murders.blogspot.com ie Jim Anderson

From: Sharon4Anderson@aol.com Fred Grittner Clerk MN Courts fred.grittner@courts.state.mn.us
Chief Judge
Kathleen R. Gearin
Ramsey County

View Chief Judge Kathleen
Code of Judicial Conduct
Member- Steering Committee, MNCIS (Minnesota Court Information System) Prosecuting Attorney- Ramsey County Attorney's Office, 1975-1985
Further Affiant Sharon4anderson@aol.com is challenging the constitutionality of denial "due process" by the Lawyers_JudgeLawyers_Boards that refuse e-mail electronic communications to file complaints.
THEREFORE: AFFIANT Sharon4Anderson must go public, educational to expose the corruption in the courts via city,county and state attorneys.
www.sharonagmn2010.blogspot.com 2010 Candidate 4 MNAG.
To: me@glennbeck.com, jasonlewisshow@live.com, chrisbaker@ktlkfm.com, nancylazaryan@gmail.com, whistleblower@startribune.com, harold@theminnesotawatchdog.com, maggie@kaxe.org, greg@wersalforjustice.com, Dateline@NBCUNI.com, owings1064@hotmail.com, info@judicialwatch.org, jrgraham@oricom.ca, info@givemeliberty.orgCC: jason.johnston@zimmreed.com, john.choi@ci.stpaul.mn.us, john.choi@co.ramsey.mn.us, rca@co.ramsey.mn.us, mark.dayton@state.mn.us, attorney.general@state.mn.us, attorney@co.clay.mn.us, attorney@co.dakota.mn.us, attorneys.office@co.itasca.mn.us, attorneyregistration@courts.state.mn.us
Sent: 1/31/2011 8:37:11 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: FwdLawlessAmerica Aaron FosterJudge KathleenGearinPattyBruceGearinSharonAnderson

Mon 31Feb2010

Found another great site via Blogger Friend Don Mashak who never gives up or give's in. www.lawlessamerica.com http://donmashaksmn10judicialdistrictfreepre.blogspot.com/
Sharon's Briefs.

http://forums.e-democracy.org/groups/stpaul-issues/files/f/900-2007-02-27T034409Z/WritProA06-1150_30Jun06.pdf

Further by information and belief Affiant Sharon Scarrella Anderson is duly concerned that 2nd Judicial District Chief Judge Kathleen Gearin's demeanor is suspect and that Gearin apparantly is packing did not pay her 2010 Property Taxes at xx St. Alban's Address near Grand Ave. in St. Paul Published.
Further in the last Election these Judges did not file with the Sec. of State a Waiver of their Residence's for Public Preview to have knowledge of who they were voting for and if the Judge lived in the District.
To hear the Expungment of the Barb Winn www.justiceforbarbara.com Aaron Foster Case is Bizzare,
In this writer_quitam_relator Sharon Anderson re; Aaron Foster Manager of the St.Paul Police Impound Lot to Expunge a 22 Grand Jury Indictment then Judge Cleary acting in concort with lawyer Earl Gray to suppress evidence to the 12 person jury to not convict as NO HAND GUN COULD BE FOUND. FURTHER: Tys Judge Gearin et al to the Gang Strike Force Settlement's
www.mgsfsettlement.com which the undersigned has CLAIMS.

If in Fact the Judge Gearin is packing the public must have knowledge if Gearin is a registered Gun Owner, etc. Where did She buy the Gun,Has the Judge "taken" training to shoot. etc.
AffidavitPrejudice Kathleen Gearin Judge
Affidavit of Prejudice against Judge Kathleen Gearin et al,Ramsey Dist. ... Sharon Anderson v. Kathleen Gearin - Google Search Impeachments were brought ...
www.slideshare.net/.../affidavit-prejudicejudge-kathleen-gearin - Cached

1. Rumor has it that this Judge is "packing" a Gun while in her Courtroom.?
a. If in Fact then the Public "must" be apprised specifically in the
Expungment of Aaron Foster due to be heard 16Feb.2011
"Foster is scheduled to appear Feb. 16 before Ramsey County District Judge Kathleen Gearin on the matter. She would not comment on the case or on expungements in general, saying only that "each case is unique."
.

Acquitted in high-profile 1981 Maplewood death, man wants case ...

Jan 22, 2011 ... Aaron Foster Sr. was acquitted of his girlfriend s murder. ... 16 before Ramsey County District Judge Kathleen Gearin on the matter. ...
www.twincities.com/ci_17165231?source=most_viewed - Cached
►
Acquitted in high-profile 1981 Maplewood death, man wants case ...

Jan 25, 2011 ... Aaron Foster Sr. was acquitted of his girlfriend s murder. ...
www.twincities.com/north/ci_17165231 - Cached
Acquitted in high-profile 1981 Maplewood death, man wants case ...

Jan 25, 2011 ... Aaron Foster Sr. was acquitted of his girlfriend s murder. ...
www.twincities.com/crime/ci_17165231 - Cached
Show more results from twincities.com
Behind The Blue Wall: [MN] Ex-St. Paul Police Dept. employee Aaron ...
- Jan 22
Jan 22, 2011 ... Aaron Foster was on a violent rampage. And, as you will see, below, ... 16 before Ramsey County District Judge Kathleen Gearin on the matter. ... Bruce said Winn's family members would attend the expungement hearing. ...
behindthebluewall.blogspot.com/.../mn-ex-st-paul-police-dept-employee.html - Cached
Sharons Informal Brief re: FIAFEA_FIRREA_A09-2031 ...
- 6 visits - Jan 29
Dec 26, 2009 ... Sharons QuoWarranto v. MN Judge Edward Toussaint A09-2031 ... SCAP,Judges Kathleen Gearin,Joanne Smith,Gregg .... Minnesota's Strike Force “taking” our Cars for Profit, involving Aaron Foster, Manager of ...
sharon4anderson.wordpress.com/.../sharons-informal-brief-re-fiafea_firrea_a09-2031/ - Cached
St.Paul Police(RICO)
- 8 visits - Jan 27
Judge Kathleen Gearin et al - Google Search . .... If you are experiencing an environmental emergency or are witnessing an environmental event that may .... for quitam triple damages against Aaron Foster Manager and Police Impound Lot. ...
stpaulpolice-rico.blogspot.com/ - Cached - Similar

St Peter Police Department Mn - Free Latest News

Death by gunshot from .38 Specialthat Aaron Foster threw out of acar window after ... 16 before Ramsey County District Judge Kathleen Gearin on the matter. ...
lolow.gicp.net/st-peter-police-7vz.html - Cached

2. Has Chief Judge Kathleen Gearin former Ramsey County Attorney Assistant re: Kathleen Greenly Murder and Barb Winn Murder such a Heinous Conflict even with her Sibling Patty Gearins

Maplewood Voices

[The Minnesota Supreme Court ruling] affirms the previous ruling by Ramsey Chief Judge Kathleen Gearin. .... The company is owned and operated by Patricia Gearin. ... Patricia M. Gearin, et al. v. City of Maplewood, Minnesota, et al., ...
maplewoodvoices.blogspot.com/ - Cached - Similar
Maplewood Voices: Editorial: Mr. Hjelle's nose

Mar 12, 2008 ... The link of Patty Gearin's arrest occurring in Maplewood was enough ... That's Judge Kathleen Gearin, Assistant Chief Judge among the well ...
maplewoodvoices.blogspot.com/.../editorial-mr-hjelles-nose.html - Cached - Similar
Maplewood Voices: Lillie Newspapers: Mr. Hjelle and the Sherrie Le ...

Mar 12, 2008 ... District Judge Kathleen Gearin ruled Feb. 29 that termination of former ... The link of Patty Gearin's arrest occurring in Maplewood was ...
maplewoodvoices.blogspot.com/.../lillie-newspapers-mr-hjelle-and-sherrie.html - Cached - Similar

From: bill@LawlessAmerica.com
Reply-to: registration@LawlessAmerica.com
To: Sharon4Anderson@aol.com
Sent: 1/31/2011 7:36:55 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Lawless America - New User Details

Welcome Sharon4Anderson,
Your application has been approved by our administration team.
Your account with the following details:
Email : Sharon4Anderson@aol.com
Username : Sharon4Anderson

has been activated.
We welcome you to our online community and trust that together
we will grow.
Enjoy the experience!
Kind Regards,
William M. Windsor
www.LawlessAmerica.com

NOTE: This email was automatically generated from Lawless America (http://www.lawlessamerica.com).

/s/ Sharon4Anderson@aol.com ECF_P165913_sa1299 Attorney Pro Se_InFact,Private Attorney General Sharon4 Anderson - Google Profile ,Candidate 2010 iGoogle www.sharonagmn2010.blogspot.com Homestead Act of 1862 Blogger: User Profile: Sharon Anderson SharonsYahoo!
Shar1058's Buzz Activity Page - My Buzz Activity - Yahoo! Buzz
political ?(Sharon4Anderson?)
Sharon Anderson's Blog Click here: Sharon4Council file4[1]Shar_thune_22.pdf - Google Docs
Disclaimer on Site'sThe Electronic Communications Privacy Act MY FindLaw (ECPA) sets out the provisions for access, use, disclosure, interception and privacy protections of electronic communications. Sharon4Anderson Scribd pdf files. The law was enacted in 1986 and covers various forms of wire and electronic communications. According to the U.S. Code, electronic communications "means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce." ECPA prohibits unlawful access and certain disclosures of communication contents. Additionally, the law prevents government entities from requiring disclosure of electronic communications from a provider without proper procedure. The Legal Institute provides Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which encompasses ECPA. Blogger: Dashboard
NOTICE: This communication is not encrypted. This e-mail (including any attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, and Electronic Communications Privacy Act The CAN-SPAM Act: Requirements for Commercial Emailers

Dist. Attorney caught in sexting scandal says he's immune from lawsuits | Minneapolis and St. Paul | kare11.com

2011-01-18T05:25:00.000-08:00

Dist. Attorney caught in sexting scandal says he's immune from lawsuits | Minneapolis and St. Paul | kare11.com

Wersal_Weasal4Justice_8thCir.Judicial Win

2010-07-31T16:29:00.000-07:00

« Mood lighting
Longtime Legal Aid leader Jerry Lane to retire in 2011 »
8th Circuit strikes down judicial campaign restrictions
Jul 29th, 2010 by Mark Cohen

A big day for judicial candidate Greg Wersal
A split three-judge panel of the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals this morning issued an opinion sweeping away a couple of the state’s remaining restrictions on judicial campaigns.
The federal appellate court struck down rules barring judicial candidates from endorsing candidates for political offices and from personally soliciting contributions from small groups and individuals.
“[W]e think the Constitution favors strict recusal standards and fewer speech restrictions,” wrote Clarence Arlen Beam for the two-judge majority.
In his dissent, Judge Kermit E. Bye, said, “[W]here a state has crafted its restrictions carefully to maintain a fair and impartial judiciary, in both practice and appearance, as Minnesota has done here, the First Amendment must yield.”
The 54-page decision is Wersal v. Sexton, et al.
The ruling is a huge victory for attorney Greg Wersal, currently running for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court against Justice Helen Meyer. Wersal has been on a more than a decade-long quest to end the restrictions Minnesota has placed on judicial campaigns that has taken him on several tips to the 8th Circuit and all the way to U.S. Supreme Court. His challenges have eviscerated the framework for the vast majority of the restrictions.
In a release sent shortly after the ruling was announced, Wersal trumpeted, “This is a major victory toward the goal of holding judges accountable through free, open and competitive elections. I now hope to raise the money necessary to tell the people of Minnesota that the judges, including my opponent in this race, want a constitutional amendment that would strip the public of their right to vote for judges. I will do everything I can to protect the right to vote.”
Proponents of the restrictions had argued that they were necessary to preserve the appearance of an unbiased and unbeholden judiciary.
We will post a fuller story on our main site later today.
Posted in Uncategorized
5 Responses to “8th Circuit strikes down judicial campaign restrictions”
on 29 Jul 2010 at 6:51 pm1 Levi Swank

So the only remaining restriction is that elections must be non-partisan? Or are there other restrictions left intact?
on 30 Jul 2010 at 9:20 am2 Sharon Scarrella Anderson

http://minnlawyer.com/wp-files/blog-folder/wersal.pdfMucho Thanks to Greg Wersal is not fighting aloneIn re:Scarrella4Justice 221NW2d562 Published by Judicial Tryanny without Royalitys to circumvent MN Const. Art. III Separation of Powers, Voting Rights Act Eligible to Vote then and therefore Eligible for ANY OFFICE.Sharon Anderson aka Peterson_Chergosky_1st Husband Scarrella for Quiet Titles Search is the only Certified Sane Candidate for MN Attorney Generalhttp://www.sharonagmn2010.blogspot.com on the Graves of Tenants in Common and Murder of 2nd Husband http://www.cpljimanderson.blogspot.com Sharons Quo Warranto at http://www.taxthemax.blogspot.com We must have Decency,Morality,Judicial Reform 4 Accountability in Government Sharon opposes ShariaLaw_We must Repeal ObamaCare and or “If it aint broke don’t fix it” Medicare does not include Dental_Glasses,Hearin Aids_ Stand with AZ v. the Feds Immigration Reform.WERSAL THE WEASAL4JUSTICE WE LOVE YOU WE THE COMMAN PERSONS.
on 30 Jul 2010 at 11:10 am3Christian

Sharon, I didn’t understand a word you just said.
on 30 Jul 2010 at 1:07 pm4Mark Cohen

LOL, Christian. Puts me in the mood for some tots …
on 30 Jul 2010 at 2:32 pm5John

I would like Professor Heidenreich to review Sharon’s comment.
on 31 Jul 2010 at 7:21 pm6 Sharon Scarrella AndersonYour comment is awaiting moderation.

YOUR LAWYERS ARE NO FUN ANYONE CAN WRITE A “CAN BRIEF” fROM Pro Se Candidate for Texas AG Jon Roland.DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADOCase No. 02CV0127___________________________________________________
KENNETH L. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARY J. MULLARKEY, et al.,
Defendants.
——————————————————————————–
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS(INCORPORATING AUTHORITY)
——————————————————————————–
Plaintiff Kenneth L. Smith (hereinafter, “Smith”), pro se, respectfully submits this Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Incorporating Authority), stating as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Article VI, section 9 of the Colorado constitution grants this Court the right and the duty to hear all civil cases brought before it, and any attempt to take that right and duty away is null and void. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146, 149 (1921). Still, Defendants have advanced the astounding proposition that this Court — a court of general jurisdiction — does not even have jurisdiction to hold them accountable for violations of federal law; unsurprisingly, the United States Supreme Court emphatically begs to differ. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369-75 (1990) (“no valid excuse” rule).
While absolute quasi-judicial immunity is “strong medicine,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988), it is only administered when the ‘patient’ doesn’t need it. Specifically, participants in a tribunal only qualify for absolute immunity where the safeguards built into the process are deemed ‘adequate to control unconstitutional conduct.’ Horvitz v. Board of Medical Examiners of the State of Colorado, 822 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1987). And in a case decided only five months ago, evaluating a process substantially identical to Colorado’s, the Second Circuit found virtually identical safeguards inadequate. Diblasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292 (2nd Cir. 2003).
Res judicata requires that the matter be decided by a competent court, and Defendants are not legally competent to decide whether they have committed a tort for which they potentially owe $25,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). A dozen fatal flaws in Defendants’ argument were identified, but need not be recounted here.
Also, it is almost unimaginable that any state bar in the 21st century would require an applicant to undergo an invasive psychiatric examination simply because they didn’t like his journalistic and internet expose of a public figure — much less, that an American attorney would claim that no constitutional rights were violated by such action. But that is precisely what counsel is alleging by invoking the qualified immunity defense — manifestly frivolous at this point, as the Defendants are stuck with Smith’s facts, and must prove their defense to a certainty. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972). Due to the astonishing array of civil rights violations committed by the Defendants, the length of this brief has more than doubled, and unavoidably so.
Finally, the Defendants’ frivolous, baseless, and vexatious request for attorneys’ fees must be addressed.
ARGUMENT
I. SMITH’S CLAIMS FALL SQUARELY WITHIN THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION
Smith raised three classes of claim in this case: (1) Section 1983 claims, alleging violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law, (2) an array of facial challenges to the constitutionality of Colo.R.Civ.P. (hereinafter, “Rule”) 201, and (3) a separate claim for relief pursuant to article II, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution. Smith brings these claims pursuant to article VI, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution, which states:
The district courts shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided herein, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.
When a civil claim is first raised in a Colorado trial court, it has both the right and the duty to adjudicate and determine it — and any attempt to take that right and duty away is null and void. Western Union, supra.
Conversely, the Colorado Supreme Court, “except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only.” Colo. Const. art. VI, § 6(1). It has original jurisdiction to issue writs, Id., art. VI, § 3, but even that authority is discretionary. Shore v. District Court, 127 Colo. 487, 258 P.2d 485 (1953). Unlike its federal counterpart, it has no other judicial powers, and cannot expand its own jurisdiction by rule of court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72, 424 P.2d 772 (1967). As such, its authority over bar admission matters can only come from its general superintending control over the courts, Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3, and it can only act as an administrative agency answerable to the Colorado and federal constitutions, and by implication, this Court.1
While the Defendants’ “subject-matter jurisdiction” argument is flimsy enough under state law, it is breathtakingly frivolous under federal law, for under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, sec. 2, this Court has a duty to enforce federal law. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-76 (1990). The Howlett Court observed:
A state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of “valid excuse.” “The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it.”
An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse.
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 369-70 (citations omitted).
“The force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by mere mention of the word ‘jurisdiction.’” Id., 496 U.S. at 382-83. But if the Defendants could have their way, no state court would have authority to hear Smith’s Section 1983 claims. This is clearly inconsistent with federal law, and would not qualify as a “valid excuse.” Cf., Id., 496 U.S. at 374-75 (“valid excuse” essentially limited to forum non conveniens).
It’s a matter of headnote law: “State courts as well as federal courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 cases.” Id., 496 U.S. at 358. Smith has advanced claims under Section 1983 which allege, for example, that his right to procedural due process was violated. But while Smith may not have a constitutional right to practice law, he has an absolute right to procedural due process, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), a separate tort of constitutional significance, which may be vindicated in this Court irrespective of whether he is entitled to a law license. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 122 S.Ct. 2354 (2002) (punitive damages).2 Smith is thus entitled to be heard in this Court.
II. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED A “CLEAR ENTITLEMENT” TO IMMUNITY IN THIS MATTER.
The bounds of judicial immunity are defined by competing public policy interests: the need to allow judges to render difficult decisions without fear of recrimination, juxtaposed against the citizen’s right to rely upon (and ultimately, claim the protection of) our laws. After all, if a judge can disregard settled law with impunity, we can’t rely on it as a guide to govern our daily affairs, never knowing when some black-robed Uday Hussein might decide to make an ‘exception’ to the rules. See, Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Carey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (liberty “finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt”). As such, absolute immunity is only bestowed on judges in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings affording aggrieved parties with timely, well-established, and effective remedies as a matter of right. Horvitz, supra.
To prevail on this motion, the Defendants must establish a “clear entitlement” to absolute immunity, Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1370 (10th Cir. 1991), and as such, bear the burden of proving that they were engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial acts, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), and there is no question of fact whether the procedural safeguards adopted were “adequate,” Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dept. of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1994) — not just on paper, but in actual fact. Devous v. Campbell, 16 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1994). Further, as this is a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), all factual disputes and inferences are decided in Smith’s favor. E.g., Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
A. Colorado’s Bar Admission Process Lacks Adequate Safeguards
1. Aggrieved Bar Applicants Are Entitled To An Effective Remedy For Injuries Of Constitutional Magnitude
Absolute judicial immunity is doled out only sparingly, Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, and only in those situations where the aggrieved party can invoke procedural or other safeguards deemed adequate to control unconstitutional conduct. Horvitz, supra.3 And substance controls.4
The seminal case in this area is Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), wherein it was held that federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”) are as entitled to judicial immunity as their counterparts in federal and state trial courts. In so holding, the Butz court reasoned that
…federal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same safeguards as are available in judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, and the transcripts of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Butz makes it clear that it is not the act of ‘judging’ that gives rise to absolute immunity5 but rather, the presence of safeguards adequate to right judicial wrongs. In effect, judges enjoy absolute immunity only when they don’t need it. See, e.g., Forrester, supra. Every judicial immunity case can be explained with resort to this rule, including those involving state trial courts.6
And if you aren’t independent, you can’t be a judge for purposes of judicial immunity law.
The Butz Court explained that a proceeding is “adversarial” if the administrative tribunal is exercising judgment “free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency,” Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, observing that “there was considerable concern that persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level [under the pre-Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“) system could not exercise independent judgment because they were required to perform prosecutorial and investigative functions as well as their judicial work, and because they were often subordinate to executive officials within their agency.” Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted).
The otherwise unremarkable case of Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985), adds an element of timeliness to the immunity equation. In a fact situation close to this one, while the plaintiff was able to have a prison disciplinary board decision overturned upon appeal, he was unable to have it overturned in a timely manner; he lost his “good time,” and with it, his liberty. At least with respect to federal immunity law, “justice too long delayed is justice denied.”7
And if a ‘right’ only exists on paper, it may not as well even exist there, and Butz, Forrester, and Horwitz all presuppose that the procedural remedies in place actually work. But if there was any doubt on that score, the Tenth Circuit eradicated it in Devous v. Campbell, observing that
…Wyoming law [controlled] the unconstitutional conduct in this case as required by the third prong of Horwitz, and in fact, Plaintiff’s rights were vindicated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming’s reversal of his suspension. It was precisely because Wyoming law required certain procedural steps, and because Defendants failed to interpret the law correctly, that Plaintiff was able to gain redress for Defendants’ unconstitutional actions in Wyoming courts prior to filing this suit. Thus, the safeguards set forth by Wyoming law and the Wyoming courts’ willingness to enforce those safeguards in a manner consistent with due process were sufficient to control the unconstitutional conduct in this case.
Devous, 16 F.3d 415, 1994.C10.41454, ¶ ¶ 12-13 (10th Cir. 1994) (Versuslaw) (emphasis added).
Taken together, these cases hold that unless the aggrieved party has a clear, established, and timely mechanism for forcing government agents to follow the law that actually works, absolute judicial immunity cannot be granted. Every binding judicial immunity decision in this Circuit can be explained by resort to this rule, as can every circuit court case citing Horwitz.8
Diblasio v. Novello is the most recent case in this area of law. Decided just five months ago, that court held on facts substantially identical to the case at bar that New York officials involved in its physician disciplinary process were not entitled to absolute immunity. In distinguishing its decision from the vast array of cases granting immunity (and citing Horvitz), that court observed that “license suspension procedures vary, and the procedures at issue in those cases generally provide physicians much greater protection from erroneous deprivation than New York’s procedure….” Diblasio, 344 F.3d at 300, fn. 2.
Like the regulators in Diblasio, the Board of Law Examiners can only recommend a course of action, Rule 201.10(d)-(e), and Board members are both appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Justices. Rule 201.2(1)(b). And the Second Circuit found this kind of scheme damning for immunity purposes:
Although these procedures provide some protection to physicians subjected to summary suspension proceedings, the efficacy of those procedures are seriously diminished by other features of § 230. First, by the terms of § 230, the Board’s hearing committee has the power to suggest a course of action only while the commissioner has the final authority to summarily suspend a physician’s license. See § 230(12)(a). Second, although the hearing committee must initiate suspension proceedings, the independence of that body is severely undermined by the commissioner’s appointment and removal powers: eighty percent of the Board members and, derivatively, we can assume that approximately eighty percent of those on the hearing panel, are appointed by the commissioner herself, see, § 230(1), and can be removed at the commissioner’s “pleasure,” see id. at § 230(3). . . . In short, under § 230 the commissioner has virtually unfettered authority….
Diblasio, 344 F.3d at 298-99.
2. Binding International Law Guarantees Bar Applicants An Effective Remedy
Ratified in 1992 — after the immunity cases — the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) requires signatory States “[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 3, cl. (3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. The ICCPR is an “international Bill of Rights,” governing the relationship between a signatory State and her citizens.9 Rights protected under the ICCPR include that to access to the courts (art. 14), to not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy (art. 17), to freedom of religion (art. 18) and expression (art. 19) to engage in public affairs (art. 25), and to equal protection of the laws (art. 26) — corresponding to Smith’s Section 1983 claims involving violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
While the ICCPR doesn’t create any new rights under domestic law, in this case, it doesn’t have to. The Constitution declares that a validly enacted treaty is the law of the land, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and if an act of Congress is not needed to give force to a treaty, it becomes binding law upon ratification. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951). And this rule makes intuitive sense — after all, requiring Congress to pass a bill doing exactly nothing would be a colossal waste of time, even for Congress.10 Accordingly, the ICCPR — at least, as it pertains to the matter before this Court11 — is either redundant or self-executing.
And timing in this matter is critical, for “international law is part of our law,” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), and an act of congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). And as it has been ratified by virtually every nation in the civilized world,12 the ICCPR is not just our law by operation of treaty, but it has become jus cogens law.13 Hence, any judge-made law concerning judicial immunity to the contrary is null and void. See, Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
Whether this Court finds it in Butz, Devous, Diblasio, or the ICCPR, it has no choice but to find that judges are only immune from personal liability where the law provides an aggrieved citizen an alternative “effective remedy.”
3. Colorado’s Bar Admission Procedure Fails The Butz/Cleavinger/Horvitz Test, And Is Unable To Provide An Effective Remedy
Cleavinger v. Saxner lists six factors “characteristic [] of the judicial process”: (a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his function without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
In this case, five of the factors weigh in opposition to absolute immunity, of which four can be addressed summarily. First and most obviously, published opinions are not issued in admission proceedings and as such, there is no precedent upon which a participant may rely. Second, the one and only binding decision on an application is made by the state supreme court justices themselves, Rule 201.10(3), and no established avenue exists for a timely appeal on the merits. Third, the process falls comically short of an adversarial one as defined by Butz, insofar as Board members serve at the pleasure of the state supreme court, Rule 201.2(1)(b), and they cannot even be trusted to keep their own prosecutors and triers of fact separate.14 First Am. Complaint (hereinafter, “FAC”), ¶ 3. Finally, the justices are elected public officials, who are by definition not insulated from political influence — a fact further borne out by partisan decisions rendered from the bench.15
However, a careful reading of Butz reveals that the aforementioned Cleavinger ‘factors’ are themselves safeguards, and the list is not intended to be exclusive. Mylett v. Mullican, 992 F.2d 1347, 1353 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Horwitz is still good law, and this Court’s only job with respect to this issue is to answer one simple question: Were the safeguards in place in fact ‘sufficient’ to control the unconstitutional conduct Smith has alleged? And the only way to do this is to analyze the admission process on an “as-applied” basis. See, Devous, supra.
a. Initial Investigation Prior To Inquiry Panel Review
In Colorado, extensive investigations into an applicant’s fitness to practice law are not conducted as a matter of course. Rather, Rule 201.9(1) requires the executive director to conduct an investigation “pursuant to guidelines developed by the Bar Committee,” and his initial decision on whether “probable cause” exists to investigate further is to be reviewed by “a member of the Bar Committee” designated by its chair. As investigations are only initiated after the applicant has met all “objective” requirements for admission, time is clearly of the essence; the secondary review process is presumptively designed to keep the Executive Director from making arbitrary or capricious decisions, or decisions otherwise at variance with constitutional requirements.
Under Devous, this Court need not determine whether these procedural safeguards are adequate, because as a practical matter they do not exist. Defendant Coyle warranted that no written guidelines existed, and their putative “oral guidelines” are so vague as to be utterly meaningless. FAC, ¶ 30. Similarly, an internal Board document indicates that the legal requirement of review by a Bar Committee member is routinely disregarded, and that Smith’s application was not given the consideration required by law. FAC, ¶ 32.
And this is hardly a trivial matter. Smith met every objective qualification for admission to practice on or about May 5, 1996, but as a direct result of Defendant Alan Ogden’s unilateral and unreviewed decision, Smith suffered a four-month suspension of his right to practice law, without notice, a hearing, or even a cursory explanation. When confronted with a similar situation in Diblasio, the Second Circuit found such practices unacceptable:
In short, under § 230 the commissioner has virtually unfettered authority to determine whether a physician’s license should be summarily suspended pending resolution of misconduct charges — a process that, in this case, took eight months. The absence of meaningful safeguards against arbitrary executive action in a summary suspension proceeding weigh against extending absolute immunity to [the defendants.]
Diblasio, 344 F.3d at 299.
b. The Inquiry Panel Process
The “due process vagueness” problem inherent in Colorado’s bar admission procedure has been discussed at extensive length in Smith’s motion for injunctive relief, incorporated herein by reference. In short, the standardless “any evidence” standard is no “standard” at all, and a statute permitting bar examiners to consider any evidence they damn well please necessarily means that activity sheltered by the First Amendment is fair game. And if that First Amendment line hadn’t been crossed so flagrantly by the Defendants, the matter probably would not be before this Court. It can safely be said that there are no safeguards in the admission process which were adequate to control such McCarthy-esque conduct — either in theory or practice.
On account of the lack of standards and meaningful judicial review, the dilemma that a bar applicant faces is one of whether to surrender his or her rights in the face of official intimidation and blackmail. At least in the inquiry panel process, Smith succumbed to the Board’s blackmail, answering questions (e.g., “Why don’t you let go?”) which should never have been asked, out of the reasonable fear that failure to cooperate would have dire consequences. Smith drew the line, and reasonably so, at their outrageous demand for an involuntary psychiatric examination, which he was expected to pay for out of his own pocket.
A more concrete example of an ineffectual “safeguard” is the requirement in Rule 201.9(6) that the inquiry panel commit their findings to writing within thirty days of reaching a decision on whether probable cause exists to challenge an applicant’s fitness to practice law. Presumably, this statutory provision is intended to protect applicants’ due process rights, both by requiring the panel to conduct its business with necessary dispatch and to elucidate the legal and factual basis upon which their decision rests. Moreover, this requirement is jurisdictional in nature. See, Shaball v. State Compensation Ins. Authority, 799 P.2d 399, 402 (Colo.App. 1990) (time limit is jurisdictional when delay affects “private rights”).
This “safeguard” again fails the Devous test. The Inquiry Panel Defendants reached their probable cause determination on Smith’s application on July 28, 1998, FAC, ¶ 53, but didn’t submit their findings, as required by statute, until October 26, 1988. FAC, ¶ 54. What’s more, the Defendants buried the evidence of their willful noncompliance in a stack of documents several inches thick.
c. The Hearing Panel Process
As bad as these procedures are, the hearing panel phase of Colorado’s admission process is where justice truly meets high comedy — for at this point, any resemblance to a court proceeding is strictly accidental.
We start with the hearing panel chair, endowed with authority to rule on motions and issue subpoenas. But not only is the chair not a judge, there is nothing in the statute requiring the chair to be an attorney! Rule 201.10(2); see Rule 201.2(1)(b) (two of the eleven Committee members required to be non-attorneys). As such, you could have the bizarre spectacle of a cosmetologist ruling on subtle issues of First Amendment law, without any mechanism for timely review.
Under Butz, the trier of fact has to be “free from pressures by . . . other officials within the agency.” Thus, even ignoring the ludicrous spectacle of Carlos Samour’s appearance on both the inquiry and hearing panels involved in considering Smith’s application, FAC, ¶ 3, there is no real question that the hearing is not ‘adversarial.’ Hearing panel members are chosen from a shallow pool of eleven ‘jurors’ — who are also named from time to time as inquiry panel members. Rule 201.6. It is not hard to see how members of a hearing panel might be induced to “see things” the inquiry panel’s way, as jurors become prosecutors and vice versa, and they may need a reciprocal favor somewhere down the road.
The formal hearing itself is normally confidential, and the hearing panel “shall not be bound by the formal rules of evidence.” Rule 201.10(2)(c). Again as contrasted to a civil trial, there are none of the customary assurances that allegations made against an applicant are true, relevant, or even reasonably credible.
This situation is compounded by the lack of procedural rules governed by binding precedent and enforced by reviewing courts. The most odious example from this case is Defendant Backes’ summary decision ordering Smith to submit to an involuntary psychiatric examination conducted by one of four psychiatrists hand-picked by the Board, in contravention of federal law, the Colorado constitution, and even the Board’s own enabling statute. Ignoring the apparent illegality of the order itself, if the admission proceeding had been conducted pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, the request for the examination would have been denied as a matter of law, as “good cause” requires more than a government official’s opinion. (As this matter is discussed at greater length in his motion for a show cause order, Smith incorporates it herein by reference.)
The mischief factor inherent in such an arrangement is enormous. As psychiatry is arguably only two steps removed from shamanism, it is relatively easy to find an “expert” who will testify to virtually anyone (including President Bush16) having a ‘mental illness.’ And as the physicians in question can count on continuing to receive a steady stream of lucrative referrals in exchange for Board-friendly opinions, they have a natural incentive to provide them.
This state of affairs leads inexorably to arbitrary, capricious, and ultimately outcome-based decisions. And while Smith is only privy to two evidentiary rulings by hearing panel chairs, the two rulings are sufficient to indicate that this kind of cronyism and corruption may take place in the agency. When Smith refused to obey the examination order on constitutional grounds, he was denied a Rule 201.10 hearing, but when bar applicant Leonard Alford Thomas refused to submit to the same order, he was granted a hearing. FAC, ¶ 87(e). As Mr. Thomas was then a candidate for the state House of Representatives, he could well have received preferential treatment on this account. Or more likely, Smith may have been denied a hearing because the panel members had no legitimate reason for denying him a license, and needed to invent one.
d. The Colorado Supreme Court’s Role
At least in theory, the Colorado Supreme Court’s role in the bar admission procedure is to review their subordinates’ work, to ensure that constitutional and other strictures were observed. But since the Court, by and through agents serving at its “pleasure,” Rule 201.2(1)(b), maintains plenary control over every aspect of the admission procedure, it blends the roles of investigator, prosecutor, and judge. The Diblasio court found such an arrangement problematic, noting that
as agency head she appears to wear several hats in the course of a summary proceeding: overseer of the investigation, initiator of charges and summary proceedings, and final arbiter of the decision to impose and sustain the summary suspension of a physician’s license. By blending the roles of investigator, prosecutor, and judge, § 230 unduly risks compromising the independence and neutrality of the commissioner’s judgment, and abrogating the checking function achieved in the judicial system by separating investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial staffs.
Diblasio, 344 F.2d at 300.
Judicial independence is a vital ‘check’ on unconstitutional conduct, and its absence weighs overwhelmingly against a grant of immunity. After all, where an independent court is free to say that the Defendants have committed a tort and a crime, the Colorado Supreme Court justices are not “independent” enough to be expected to confess their own criminal negligence. E.g., United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (supervisory liability under 18 U.S.C. § 241),
A final due process check is the issuance of a detailed written opinion. Without it, there is no assurance that the tribunal’s decision was made on the basis of the record and only the record. The Butz Court found this aspect of federal administrative law crucial to its grant of immunity to administrative law judges operating pursuant to the federal APA:
A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, and the transcripts of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.
Butz, 478 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
If you lose your case in front of, say, the Federal Communications Commission, the ALJ has to follow agency precedent and tell you in detail why you lost, and you have a right to appeal the decision to a higher court. By stark contrast, bar applicant Smith has no way of knowing why a convicted felon and cocaine dealer with known Democratic Party ties received a law license from Democratic Party judges while he did not, and has no readily recognized avenue of appeal on the merits. And more to the point, he has no way of knowing whether he will ever be able to qualify for admission to the profession that he has spent years training for.
e. General considerations
The Defendants have taken some pains to prove to this Court that Smith was represented by counsel in this matter, Mot. at 4, as if the fact somehow has inherent talismanic significance. But that fact should raise more questions than answers for this Court: most notably, that the remedies available to Smith were either so obscure or so meaningless that even an attorney with the reputation and widely recognized skill of a David Lane couldn’t employ them on his behalf. Mot., Exh. M at 1-2. It is impossible to imagine any inherent due process value that a right to be represented by counsel adds in Colorado’s kangaroo bar “court.”
While extensive review of the case law reveals even more flaws inherent in Colorado’s bar admission process, brevity demands limits. Under Horwitz, this Court cannot grant absolute judicial immunity to the Defendants unless it finds that the safeguards in place were in fact adequate to control their alleged unconstitutional conduct.
B. Certain Defendants Were Engaged In Supervision — A Non-Judicial Act
Even in a quasi-judicial proceeding, not every act is cloaked in immunity. The Colorado Supreme Court justices delegated virtually all of those acts which could fairly be called “quasi-judicial” — e.g., fact-finding — to their subordinates on the Board of Law Examiners. Rule 201. As such, their only role in the bar admission process, apart from making the ultimate decisions on applications, was as a supervisor — an inherently administrative task, for which they are not entitled to immunity. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229-230. As supervisors, they had an affirmative obligation to ensure that Smith’s federal rights were protected, and thus, are civilly liable for failing to act. Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1994).
The same argument applies, a fortiori, to authorized agents of the Board of Law Examiners. For instance, Smith’s Professional Responsibility professor, Linda Donnelly, is named solely due to the fact that she had a legal and an ethical (CRPC 5.1) obligation to properly supervise Board attorney James Coyle. While Ms. Donnelly’s actual or constructive knowledge of the situation at bar is one which can only be ascertained via discovery, it is not an issue that can be wished away through summary judgment. Similarly, as the Board employs Defendants Donnelly, Ogden, and Coyle, Rule 201.2(2), and certain Board members had actual or constructive knowledge of their improper conduct, they had an affirmative obligation to take remedial action. Colo. RPC 5.1(c).
III. DEFENDANTS’ RES JUDICATA MOTION IS FRIVOLOUS, REDUNDANT, OR IRRELEVANT
1. The Res Judicata Motion Is Frivolous
The doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any later litigation involving the same course of action. E.g., Kerndt v. Ronan, 458 N.W.2d 466 (Nebr. 1990). The first question which must be asked here is whether the decision to deny Smith a license is a final judgment on the merits by a court, or a quasi-judicial decision by an administrative agency which just happens to be administered by a court. And to say that a decision is a final judgment on the merits simply because a court happened to make it is to elevate form over substance. See, e.g., Butz, supra.
The Supreme Court dealt with this question squarely twenty years ago, when it held that the decision of a state administrative agency reviewed by a state court is entitled to preclusive effect, but only if the claimant has been afforded the process he is due. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982) (a state “may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment”). Thus, as Smith has alleged that the Defendants deprived him of due process of law, this Court would necessarily have to decide that issue on the merits to apply res judicata. As such, Defendants’ motion for res judicata is by definition frivolous.
But it gets worse. Res judicata can only constitute an absolute bar to subsequent litigation where there is an identity of subject matter, causes of action, parties to the action, and identity of capacity in the persons for which or against whom the claim is made. E.g., Consolidated Home Supply Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. Town of Berthoud, 896 P.2d 260, 264 (Colo. 1998) (Mullarkey, J.; citations omitted). But if the Defendants were judges in that action — as they implicitly claim in their motion — they couldn’t possibly be “parties” to the current one!
And it only gets worse. Under Kremer, an administrative decision can be given preclusive effect when it is reviewed by a court, but “without some stated guidelines, and specific findings of fact, judicial review is a hollow gesture.” Elizondo v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 194 Colo. 113, 118, 570 P.2d 518, 521 (1977). Accordingly, the Hearing Panel chair’s summary decision ordering Smith to submit to an involuntary psychiatric examination, Mot., Exh. F., couldn’t have been “reviewed” under Kremer, and the order denying Smith a license, Mot., Exh. N, has never been reviewed by anyone. As such, they are not entitled to preclusive effect.
And it only gets worse. An otherwise valid court judgment only “operates as res judicata, in the absence of fraud or collusion.” Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 225 (1929) (citations omitted). Smith has alleged facts indicating that the order for the involuntary psychiatric examination was procured by the active fraud of James Coyle, FAC, ¶ ¶ 61-66, and collusion between Inquiry and Hearing Panel members, e.g., FAC, ¶ 3. Thus, this Court must necessarily decide those questions of fact before that motion can be given preclusive effect.
And it only gets worse. The covert nature of Colorado’s super-sekrit star-chamber makes it an inappropriate venue for adjudication of constitutional issues. Decisions are all presumptively ad hoc and carry no discernible precedential value; neither the Board nor the Colorado Supreme Court bother to issue written opinions, much less publish them. Moreover, the “very privacy of the proceeding militates against a meaningful constitutional adjudication, since the determination will not provide any remedy against the chill which the rules and the filing of charges” would create in other bar applicants. Garden State Bar Assn. v. Middlesex County Ethics Committee, 643 F.2d 119, 126 (3rd Cir. 1981).
And it only gets worse. It is logically impossible for the Supreme Court Defendants to render judgment on a tort claim arising from their own misconduct in issuing a decision. Specifically, a bar applicant is entitled to a detailed statement of reasons and findings of fact pertaining to the denial of his licensure application. In re Berkan, supra.; Elizondo, supra. As the “court order” in question is facially devoid of the kind of detailed explanation due process demands, Mot., Exh. N, the legality of that specific failure to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause could not possibly have been decided in a trial on the merits without use of a time machine.
And it only gets worse. Where the basis of a decision is not made clear, it “will not be a bar to a subsequent action on the same cause of action unless the sole possible ground for the decision is a determination on the merits.” 50 C.J.S. Judgment § 728 (1997) (citations omitted). As a bar applicant may be lawfully denied a license on grounds of moral, ethical, or mental unfitness to practice law, the Defendants failure to explain their decision to deny Smith a license is not res judicata with respect to his facial challenges. After all, if they decided, for example, that Smith was not morally fit to be a lawyer, it would not have to have decided whether Rule 201 is unconstitutionally vague, and it must therefore be presumed to not have reached that issue.
2. The Res Judicata Motion is Also Redundant
And it only gets worse. Res judicata presupposes that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, which a judge with a personal interest in the outcome of a case cannot as a matter of law be. Tumey, supra. This, in turn, necessarily renders the issue of res judicata moot, and quite obviously so. After all, if the Defendants are deemed immune from liability in tort, an entire class of Smith’s claims automatically disappears. Conversely, if they can be held personally liable for their tortious conduct, they have an identifiable interest in the outcome of said litigation, and would have had to have recused themselves. Id.
3. The Res Judicata Motion Is Also Irrelevant
The only decision relevant to this case that could theoretically have preclusive effect is the one denying Smith a license to practice law. But even if it were a valid court judgment, it is the one and only such decision concerning Smith’s application, and article II, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution guarantees Smith a remedy. And, as the Defendants have granted themselves absolute immunity in tort for state law purposes, the only remedy left is injunctive relief.
IV. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED AN ENTITLEMENT TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Tenth Circuit explains the procedure for analyzing a qualified immunity defense:
First, the defendant must raise the defense of qualified immunity. Once the defendant has adequately raised the defense, the plaintiff must show that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred and come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show that the official violated the clearly established law. Then the defendant assumes the normal summary judgment burden of establishing that no material facts that would defeat his claim for qualified immunity remain in dispute.
Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1396-97 (citations omitted).
A. Pertinent Law Was Clearly Established At The Time Of The Incident
To overcome a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that a defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). For a clearly established right to be violated, the exact conduct in question does not have to be previously declared unlawful; however, “in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent,” and “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1995). Thus, Smith is obliged, at the risk of stating the obvious, to tell this Court in gruesome detail what the relevant pre-existing law is.
1. The Bar Applicant’s Clearly Established “Portfolio of Rights”
What are the ‘rights’ of a bar applicant? First and foremost, a bar applicant’s interest in the right to practice law is a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, for which he or she is entitled to equal protection and due process. Schware, supra.
The Bill of Rights further protects an applicant’s right to speak on public issues, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964), to petition the government for redress of grievances, Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985), to be free from unwarranted state intrusions upon their personal privacy, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966), and to equal protection of the law. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Indirect interference in the enjoyment of these rights is as actionable as open and direct interference, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972), and ‘retaliation’ in particular is specifically proscribed. Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). Smith has asserted facts indicating the violation of each and every one of these rights, either individually or in the alternative, thereby meeting his initial burden. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
2. What Reasonable Defendants Are Charged With Knowing
“A reasonably competent government official should know the law governing his conduct,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (1982). Further, many if not all of the Defendants are lawyers, who must have a working knowledge of hornbook civil rights law and an ability to spot legal issues sufficient to pass a state bar examination, and an independent ethical obligation to either be competent in the areas of law where they practice or become competent. CRCP Rule 1.1. And with respect to our state supreme court justices, they should reasonably be expected to have an expert-level knowledge of the entire Corpus Juris Secundum.
a. The Law of Agency
The law of agency affects virtually everything a lawyer does, from hiring staff to representing clients to figuring out who to sue. It impacts this case in several ways: defining the scope of the Defendants’ authority as agents, their responsibility as supervisors, and the implications of a master-servant relationship upon immunity law.
1. Scope of a government agent’s authority
A government official is a ‘servant of the people’; the bounds of his agency and the limit of his discretion is the law. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). As such, by way of example, a judge cannot “exclude colored men [from a jury] merely because they were colored,” as that act is not “left the limits of his discretion.” Id. at 348.; see Butz, 438 U.S. at 489-90 (“A federal official who acted outside his statutory authority would be held strictly liable for his trespassory acts.”). Thus by implication, any official’s order without proper support in law is null and void, and a citizen cannot be punished for disregarding it.
2. Principal’s liability for his agent’s conduct
President Truman’s famous motto, “The buck stops here,” is also an axiom of agency law. As L.A.P.D. sergeant Stacey Koon found out the hard way (a 22-month prison sentence for failure to restrain his fellow officers during the beating of Rodney King), a supervisor may be both civilly (Woodward, supra.) and criminally (Koon, supra.) liable for civil rights violations committed by persons under their command and control.
3. Ancillary effects of an agency relationship
The Butz v. Economou doctrine, developed earlier in this brief, is that if a “judge” isn’t truly independent, he or she is not a “judge” for purposes of immunity law. In cases like Diblasio and Cleavinger, where judicial independence is notable only by its absence, Butz precludes immunity. And while Diblasio and Devous create no new law, they retrace the proper analytical process.
b. First Amendment Law
The First Amendment creates a safe harbor for citizens engaging in activities essential to the preservation of a free and democratic republic which our government may not enter, either before (prior restraint), during (censorship), or after the fact (retaliation), either directly or indirectly.
1. Freedom of Speech, Religion, and the Press: “Journalistic And Internet Exposes” Are Constitutionally Protected Conduct
One of the most obvious rights in our Constitution is the First Amendment17 right to speak one’s mind on issues of the day, free from the fear from retaliation by government officials. As Justice Frankfurter said, “one of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures — and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.” Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944).
Defendant Michael Bender may be the most capable jurist on the Colorado Supreme Court, and when the klieg lights of the media were trained upon him in Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002), he displayed a solid understanding of clearly established contours of this right. He rightly noted that the purpose of the First Amendment was “to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation — and their ideas from suppression — at the hand at an intolerant society.” Id. at 1053 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)). He quoted Justice Brandeis’ observation that “[Our founders] believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” Id. at 1052 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). And he observed that the First Amendment protected “a wide spectrum of activities,” Id. at 1051, — most certainly wide enough to protect Smith’s “journalistic and internet expose” of a corrupt public figure. And every relevant precedent invoked in Tattered Cover was settled law long before the matter of Smith’s application ever came before the Defendants.
2. The Right to Petition: Litigation Is Protected Conduct
In Mine Workers, Justice Black stated that the right to petition the government for redress of grievances was “among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” United Mine Workers Dist. 12 v. Illinois Bar Assn, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). And this truth is self-evident: the only “rights” that we as citizens have are those we have the courage to claim, and the courts, the character to enforce when asked. Majorities can take care of themselves, but at the end of the day, we are all a minority of one.
The right of access to the courts is an essential aspect of the broader right to petition. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). But even this right has limits. “Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.” Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (citations omitted). And as a matter of necessity, every practicing attorney has to know where those limits are. See, e.g., Rule 11; CRPC 3.1..
As he usually did, Justice Quinn defined those limits clearly in Protect Our Mountain Environment, observing that petitioning activity was not immunized from liability if
(1) the … claims were devoid of reasonable factual support, or if so supportable, lacked any cognizable basis in law for their assertion; and (2) the primary purpose of the … petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective; and (3) the … petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.
Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984).
To state the POME rule affirmatively, if a claim is not without factual support or devoid of legal merit, that petitioning activity is sheltered by the First Amendment. Moreover, to say that a lawyer may prosecute a claim with impunity, but a future bar applicant cannot, violates the applicant’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause. See, Romer v. Evans, supra..
3. Indirect Restraints on Protected Conduct Are Impermissible
In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, you were free to say whatever you wanted to, but if you ever said something the government didn’t like, Uday Hussein was reportedly at liberty to cut your tongue out. But there are more subtle ways for the government to control speech and/or conduct, equally impermissible under our law. As the Colorado Supreme Court, with Defendant Mary Mullarkey voting in the majority, observed:
The government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interest . . . For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his [exercise of] constitutionally protected [rights], his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to produce a result which it could not command directly. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972).
University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 947 (Colo. 1993) (emphasis added).
The doctrine banning acts of indirect governmental retaliation for protected speech is a well-traveled one, most often appearing in retaliation cases against government whistleblowers. E.g., Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (application of Pickering test). But it has also been invoked in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1970), wherein the Court held that “views and beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law.”
In Tattered Cover, Justice Bender shows a fine grasp of the clear and present danger indirect restraints pose to free speech and free inquiry. Allowing the government to say that “you can say what you like, but if we don’t like you say, we can destroy your career” is almost as menacing to free speech as the Uday Hussein-approved method. Using one of Justice Douglas’ most memorable concurrences, Bender recites the ‘parade of horribles’ indirect restraints would precipitate:
….[T]he free press as we know it disappears. Then the spectre of a government agent will look over the shoulder of everyone who reads. . . . Fear of criticism goes with every person into the bookstall. The subtle, imponderable pressures of the orthodox lay hold. Some will fear to read what is unpopular, what the powers-that-be dislike. . . . [F]ear will take the place of freedom in the libraries, book stores, and homes of the land. Through the harassment of hearings, investigations, reports, and subpoenas government will hold a club over speech and over the press. [United States v. Rumely,] 345 U.S. 41, 57-58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1053 (emphasis added).
Although the ink is barely dry on Tattered Cover, the principle undergirding it is etched in Constitutional stone: “The First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law was passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such.” Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222.
4. Indirect Restraints: The Due Process Vagueness Doctrine
The due process vagueness doctrine requires lawmakers to set reasonably clear guidelines to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of a statute, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974), and it is unconstitutionally vague if its standards are so ill-defined as to create a danger of same. E.g., Kibler v. Colorado, 718 P.2d 531, 534 (Colo. 1979); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2001). Moreover, when “a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573. And the reason is obvious: Unfettered discretion leads inexorably to selective enforcement of a statute, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 197 Colo. 19, 21, 589 P.2d 490, 491 (1979), thereby chilling the First Amendment rights of all citizens, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting), because “[w]hen one must guess what conduct or utterances may lose him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967), (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
But how much specificity is enough? Again, we turn to Defendant Mary Mullarkey for the definitive answer: statutes “confronting First Amendment freedoms must be specific enough not to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms.” People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599, 603 (Colo. 1990) (citation omitted; en banc opinion delivered by now-Chief Justice Mullarkey). And while a facially unconstitutional bar admission statute was upheld, the Court stated that the New York bar examiners’ practice of interpreting it in a manner respecting those freedoms was the dispositive fact. Law Students Civil Rights Committee, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971). As such, a reasonable bar examiner would know that he or she was on a short First Amendment leash.
c. The Right to Due Process
The Due Process Clause requires governmental entities to provide a person whose constitutionally protected interests in life, liberty, or property18 are being threatened an “opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The due process standard “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the situation demands,” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), determined by the weighing of three factors: the significance of the interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation inherent in existing procedures, and an assessment of whether improved procedures are worth the cost. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted).
1. The Process Due a Bar Applicant
With respect to professional licensure disputes, federal and state courts have determined the appropriate level of “process” due: a full, fair, trial-type hearing, Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), conducted in a timely manner, Barry v. Barchi, 433 U.S. 455 (1979). Applicants can expect their ‘fitness’ to be judged by reference to an ascertainable and reasonably explicit standard, Doe v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 356 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1966), that the licensing agency will follow its own statutes, In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1988), and that it will issue a statement of reasons and indication of the proof relied upon by decisionmakers. In re Berkan, supra., cited with approval in In re Suspension of Judith Ward Mattox, 758 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1985); see also, Elizondo, supra.
2. Due Process and the Right to Privacy
Justice Brandeis defined the constitutional right of privacy as “the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It is grounded in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and described as protection against all governmental invasions “of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), and one elemental aspect of this right is an “individual[’s] interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
“The Due Process Clause directly protects fundamental aspects of personal privacy against intrusion by the State,” Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986). And here, it is with good reason, as it is difficult to imagine more intimate and personal information than the secrets of a man’s mind, and no act more violative of his privacy and personal dignity than having them rummaged through by a state-mandated psychiatrist on a “fishing expedition” search of supposed “mental instability.” See, e.g., National Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 789 F.Supp. 430 (D.D.C. 1992). For once that information is disclosed to a third-party, the ethical tie created by the physician-patient privilege disappears, Draft Report of the ABA Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities Report to the House of Delegates, Feb. 1, 1993, at 2-3, as quoted in Wielobob, Bar Application Mental Inquiries: Unwise and Unlawful, Human Rights, Winter 1997, p. 13, and under the law as it then stood, if a Court functionary entrusted with this extraordinarily sensitive information maliciously disclosed it to third parties, the injured applicant would not even have a remedy in tort! Rule 201.2(5) (1995) (amended 2000) (fixing this problem).
Under federal law, in determining when a person should be required to undergo a psychiatric examination, a court must balance the interests involved, considering whether the subject “has a legitimate expectation of privacy, (2) if disclosure serves a compelling state interest, and (3) if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner.” Denver Police Protective Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981). As information about a person’s mental fitness can be obtained from his associates, see, In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 83, 106-07 (1961) (Black, J, dissenting) (extensive background check by Illinois bar), and the only criteria which may be applied must be related to “the singular objective of ensuring that attorneys are honest and proficient in the basic skills and knowledge of their profession,” Goldsmith v. Pringle, 399 F.Supp. 620, 625 (D.Colo. 1975), it is difficult to credibly contend that any state bar has the right to conduct such a search without first conducting a strenuous background check.
While the Fourth Amendment protections of privacy are considerable, article II, section 7 of Colorado’s constitution provides its citizens with even more zealous protection of their personal privacy. See, People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1279-80 (Colo. 1992) (Quinn, J., dissenting; collecting cases).19 Stating the obvious, Justice Bender adds: “the protections afforded by the Colorado Constitution are of little value if the [aggrieved party] is not given an opportunity” to challenge the constitutionality of a government-conducted search. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1060. Justice Bender concluded that:
Had it not been for the Tattered Cover’s steadfast stance, the zealousness of the City would have led to the disclosure of information that we ultimately conclude is constitutionally protected. This chronology demonstrates the importance of providing [parties whose rights are affected by a search] with an opportunity to contest the actions of law enforcement officials in an adversarial setting.
Id. at 1060.
If the contents of a man’s bookshelf are so sacred and precious that the government may not examine it without a proper hearing, what about the contents of a man’s mind? Surely, if government voyeurs could rummage through our deepest and darkest thoughts, hopes, and fears, for any reason or no reason at all, the contents of our bookshelves scarcely matter. Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution states, in pertinent part:
The people shall be secure in their persons . . . from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place shall issue . . . without probable cause, supported by an oath or an affirmation reduced to writing.
As no consent can be “voluntary” where failure to consent results in denial of a government benefit, Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 947, the State must show a “compelling reason or need” People v. Chard, 808 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1981), to conduct an involuntary psychiatric examination. This, in turn, requires the court to “balance the possible emotional trauma, embarrassment or intimidation to the complainant against the likelihood of the examination producing material, as distinguished from speculative, evidence.” People v. Estorga, 612 P.2d 520, 523 (Colo. 1980). And, for that reason, “good cause” actually means more than “’cause we wants it.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
3. The Americans With Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), establishing additional civil rights protections for persons with disabilities. By Jan. 26, 1992, the effective date of the Act, all public entities, including state licensing boards, see, e.g., Ware v. Wyoming Bd. of Law Examiners, 973 F.Supp. 1139 (D.Wyo. 1997); Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 880 F.Supp. 430, 441 E.D.Va. 1995), were required to comply with its provisions.
Title II prohibits “discrimination” by a “public entity” against a “qualified individual with a disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1999), defining such an individual as one “who meets the essential eligibility requirements . . . for the receipt of services or participation in programs” provided by a public entity, Id. § 12131, and an “individual with a disability” includes those who are not disabled, but are nonetheless “treated by a covered [public] entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1); Richa

Rule of Law via Gary

2010-07-15T08:34:00.000-07:00

http://freedomlawschool.grouply.com/message/36548?nm=Group&st=2010-07-14+08%3A48%3A09&et=2010-07-15+07%3A43%3A02&d_nf_fids=4004,72039&d_nf_gids=307200&m_ref=m_gnm1671888983

Queston of Rule

http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter 4/chap4toc.html Question. TITLE 234 RULES O...

http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter4/chap4toc.html

Question.

TITLE 234 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. SCOPE OF RULES, CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS, LOCAL RULES … 100

Rule 100. Scope Rules.

(A) These rules shall govern criminal proceedings in all courts including courts not of record. Unless otherwise specifically provided, these rules shall not apply to juvenile or domestic relations proceedings.

(B) Each of the courts exercising criminal jurisdiction may adopt local rules of procedure in accordance with Rule 105.

At (A) says these rules shall not apply to juvenile.

4. PROCEDURES IN SUMMARY CASES … 400

At (4.) is the venue this body is operating in.

QUESTION - seeing it says does not apply.
Then rules numbering (400) would also not apply?

If that is so they have no jurisdiction to hear this case as it involves
a juvenile lacking subject matter jurisdiction?

Best Gary

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PART D. Arrest Procedures in Summary Cases

PART D(1). Arrests With a Warrant

430. Issuance of Warrant.
431. Procedure When Defendant Arrested With Warrant.

PART D(2). Arrests Without a Warrant

440. Arrest Without Warrant.
441. Procedure Following Arrest Without Warrant.

PART E. General Procedures in Summary Cases

450. Motions [Reserved].
451. Service.
452. Collateral.
453. Joinder of Offenses and Defendants.
454. Trial in Summary Cases.
455. Trial in Defendant’s Absence.
456. Default Procedures: Restitution, Fines, and Costs.
457. Withdrawal of Charges in Summary Cases.
458. Dismissal in Summary Cases Upon Satisfaction or Agreement.

PART F. Procedures in Summary Cases for Appealing to Court of Common Pleas for Trial De Novo

460. Notice of Appeal.
461. Stays.
462. Trial De Novo.

PART G. Special Procedures in Summary Cases Under the Vehicle Code

470. Procedures Related to Licenses Suspension After Failure to Respond to Citation or Summons.
471. Disposition Report.

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Comments (1)

Lawyering Suits_USSC

2010-07-06T06:12:00.000-07:00

Lawyering Suits Pile Up at High Court

Posted by: "Jeff" trvlshpp@prodigy.net bunkky96

Tue Jul 6, 2010 3:13 am (PDT)

http://elections.startribune.com/profiles/46200.html

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/index.jsp

Lawyering Suits Pile Up at High Court

[[From client advice to attorney fees to ineffective assistance of counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court decided an unusually large number of cases last term involving how lawyers do their jobs.]]

During 2009-2010 term, some 20 percent of the decision docket involved cases on lawyering

Marcia Coyle

The National Law Journal

July 06, 2010

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463277222&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=Law.com&pt=LAWCOM%20Newswire&cn=NW_20090706&kw=Lawyering%20Suits%20Pile%20Up%20at%20High%20Court

-----------
Jeff
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Judges Kathleen Gearin re-elected

2010-06-06T09:04:00.000-07:00

Gearin re-elected to 2nd District leadership

Pioneer Press

Updated: 06/04/2010 11:53:53 PM CDT

Kathleen Gearin has been re-elected chief judge in the Second Judicial District, Ramsey County.

Judge Edward Cleary was re-elected to serve as assistant chief judge.

The leadership positions are decided by a vote of their fellow Ramsey County judges.

Gearin, 65, has sat on the bench since her election in 1986. She worked for more than 11 years before that as a prosecutor.

Both judges begin their two-year positions July 1.

— Emily Gurnon

“Sharon4Anderson”

Since: Feb 08

154

St. Paul, Minnesota

With no opposition What a Joke These Judges do not list their Residence's and Use the Courthouse for Campaign Propoganda with illegal use of Tax supported e-mail:
When the Court circumvents "due process" committs RICO acts in their "Official Capacity" We the people must make them accountable.
http://www.review-news.com/main.asp...

http://www.review-news.com/SiteImages/FileGal...
Page 20's Published re: 2009 Tax Delinquent re: 62cv10-110 Affiant is the only one to challenge out of 3 thousand propertys
Apparantly Judge Kathleen Gearin may be manulipating www.mnccc.org re: online payments to www.usbank.com by Affiant **** with Criminal Charges to www.ftc.gov Brad re: 26640063 against Laua Manning. This is another Grand Jury Indictment likened to the former Director of Elections/Taxes Lou McKenna

KATHLEEN R GEARIN 02.28.23.41.0142
APT OWN NO.85 ST ALBANS ROW
UNIT NO 6
2009 2,660.59

Affidavit of Prejudice v. Kathleen Gearin re: 62cv09-1163

****

“Sharon4Anderson”

Since: Feb 08

154

St. Paul, Minnesota

Forensic Files out there unabated by Hometown Paper
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&am...

****

“Sharon4Anderson”

Since: Feb 08

154

St. Paul, Minnesota

Voters Taxpayers have the Right to Full Disclosure of these "Elected" Judges
and what Boards,Panels they sit on for compensation
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30863135/SCAP-Membe...

Bob Bregory_ProsecutorObligations

2009-11-22T14:09:00.000-08:00

This is rather surreal. Bob Gregory on prosecutor obligations - Lawmen Google GroupsProsecutors are officers of the court and their
principal obligation is to justice. They are obligated to reveal to the
defense attorney any exculpatory evidence. I am convinced that many if not
most of them place such obligations in last place, behind winning for the
sake of winning and building a strong record of success as a stepping stone
to higher office. In Illinois they are apparently attempting to intimidate
students working for justice and possibly to avoid allowing proof of the
innocence of long term convict.

Most of them seem to forget such court rulings as these:

Hurd v. People, 25 Mich 405, 416 (1872).

Hurd v. People,25 Mich 405 - Google Search
" The prosecuting officer represents the public interest, which can never be
promoted by the conviction of the innocent. His object like that of the
court, should be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to
any pride of professional success. And however strong may be his belief of
the prisoner's guilt, he must remember that, though unfair means may happen
to result in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet,
justice so attained, is unjust and dangerous to the whole community"
Peasley,90 P.3d 754(Ariz.2004) - Google Search

In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 754 (Ariz. 2004).

Prosecutor's interest in a criminal prosecution 'is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done; courts generally recognize that the
ethical rules impose higher ethical standards on prosecutors.

Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298,1303 (Wyo.1982 - Google Search

Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1303 (Wyo. 1982).
Prosecutors must always keep in mind that duty is to seek justice, not
merely to convict, "which is most certainly a difficult duty to be carried
out carefully and cautiously."

Do you remember the old radio and, later, TV program called "Mr. District
Attorney? Weekly his oath was a part of the show's introduction:

" And it shall be my duty, not only to prosecute to the limit of the law all
those charged with crimes within this country, but to defend with equal
vigor the rights and privileges of all its citizens."

Those were the good old days (on radio and TV, that is).

Prosecutors Turn Tables on Student Journalists

By MONICA DAVEY
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/monica_davey/i
ndex.html?inline=nyt-per>

Published: October 24, 2009

EVANSTON, Ill. - For more than a decade, classes of students at Northwestern
University
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/northwe
stern_university/index.html?inline=nyt-org> 's journalism school have been
scrutinizing the work of prosecutors and the police. The investigations into
old crimes, as part of the Medill Innocence Project
<http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/journalism/undergrad/page.aspx?id=59507>
, have helped lead to the release of 11 inmates, the project's director
says, and an Illinois governor once cited those wrongful
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/false_arrest
s_convictions_and_imprisonments/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier>
convictions as he announced he was commuting the sentences of everyone on
death row.

David Protess, director of the Medill Innocence Project, says prosecutors
are overreaching.

But as the Medill Innocence Project is raising concerns about another case,
that of a man convicted in a murder 31 years ago, a hearing has been
scheduled next month in Cook County Circuit Court on an unusual request:
Local prosecutors have
<http://www.medillinnocenceproject.org/files/mckinney/mckinneysubpoena.pdf>
subpoenaed the grades, grading criteria, class syllabus, expense reports and
e-mail messages of the journalism students themselves.

The prosecutors, it seems, wish to scrutinize the methods of the students
this time. The university is fighting the subpoenas.

Lawyers in the Cook County state
<http://www.statesattorney.org/index2/about_the_office.html> 's attorney's
office say that in their quest for justice in the old case, they need every
pertinent piece of information about the students' three-year investigation
into Anthony McKinney, who was convicted of fatally shooting a security
guard in 1978. Mr. McKinney's conviction is being reviewed by a judge.

Among the issues the prosecutors need to understand better, a spokeswoman
said, is whether students believed they would receive better grades if
witnesses they interviewed provided evidence to exonerate Mr. McKinney.

Northwestern University <http://www.northwestern.edu/> and David
<http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/faculty/fulltime.aspx?id=59603>
Protess, the professor who leads the students and directs the Medill
Innocence Project, say the demands are ridiculously overreaching, irrelevant
to Mr. McKinney's case, in violation of the state's protections for
journalists and a breach of federal privacy statutes - not to mention
insulting.

John Lavine, the dean of the Medill School of Journalism, said the
suggestion that students might have thought their grades were linked to what
witnesses said was "astonishing." He said he believed that federal law
barred him from providing the students grades, but that he had no intention
of doing so in any case..

A spokeswoman for Anita Alvarez, the Cook County state's attorney, who was
elected last fall, said the prosecutors were simply trying to get to the
bottom of the McKinney case.

"At the end of the day, all we're seeking is the same thing these students
are: justice and truth," said Sally Daly, the spokeswoman. She said the
prosecutors wished to see all statements the students received from
witnesses, whether they supported or contradicted the notion of Mr.
McKinney's innocence.

"We're not trying to delve into areas of privacy or grades," Ms. Daly said.
"Our position is that they've engaged in an investigative process, and
without any hostility, we're seeking to get all of the information they've
developed, just as detectives and investigators turn over."

If the courts find that Mr. Protess and the journalism school must turn over
the student information, they risk being held in contempt if they refuse,
said Dick O'Brien, a lawyer who is representing Northwestern.

But if the school gives in to such a demand, say advocates of the Medill
Innocence Project and more than 50 similar projects
<http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members.html> (most involving law schools
and legal clinics), the stakes could be still higher, discouraging students
from taking part or forcing groups to devote time and money to legal
assistance.

"Every time the government starts attacking the messenger as opposed to the
message, it can have a chilling effect," said Barry C. Scheck, a pioneer of
the Innocence Project in New York, who said he had never seen a similar
demand from prosecutors.

In October 2003, Mr. Protess's investigative journalism classes began
looking at the case after Mr. McKinney's brother, Michael, brought it to the
attention of the Medill Innocence Project - one of more 15,000 cases the
project has been asked to consider investigating over the years.

Mr. Protess, who has been on the faculty at Northwestern since 1981 and
began leading his investigative reporting students on such cases in 1991,
created the Medill project in 1999, the same year he and his students drew
national attention for helping to exonerate and free Anthony Porter, an
inmate who had come within two days of execution.

The McKinney case took three years and nine teams of student reporters, all
of whom have since graduated from Northwestern. In the end, the teams
concluded that Mr. McKinney had been wrongly convicted of killing Donald
Lundahl, a security guard, with a shotgun one evening in September 1978 in
Harvey, a southern suburb of Chicago.

The students said they had found, among other things, that two eyewitnesses
had recanted their testimony against Mr. McKinney and could not have seen
him commit the killing because they were watching a boxing championship
(Leon Spinks vs. Muhammad Ali). The students collected an affidavit from a
gang member who, they say, confirmed Mr. McKinney's alibi that he was
running away from gang members when the shooting took place.

The students have also suggested alternative suspects in the case and
offered witnesses who said they had heard the others admit their
involvement.

In 2006, the students took their findings to the Center for
<http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/> Wrongful Convictions at
Northwestern's law school, and by late last year, the claims were being
considered by a Cook County Circuit Court judge and were described in an
article in The Chicago Sun-Times <http://www.suntimes.com/index.html> and
on the Medill <http://www.medillinnocenceproject.org/> Innocence Project
Web site.

__._,_.___

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Main Stream Media,Grass roots Rebirth,Corporate Hores

2009-11-16T07:48:00.000-08:00

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1:30 PM - Violation of the "Faithfully Execute" clause (i.e., President's failure to enforce existing immigration laws)

TUESDAY, NOV. 17
8:00 AM - Violations of the "Sovereignty" clause (i.e., Sovereignty of the Republic, North American Union)
1:30 PM - Violations of the Constitution's Property Clauses (i.e., seizure of private property for private benefit.)

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Robin K.Magee Hamline law_Tax Evasion

2009-09-10T01:49:00.000-07:00

Hamline University law professor charged with state income-tax evasion - TwinCities.com
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Hamline University law professor charged with state income-tax evasion

Hamline teacher accused of failing to pay, file returns

By Richard Chin
rchin@pioneerpress.com

Updated: 09/09/2009 11:24:43 PM CDT

Hamline University Law School associate professor Robin K. Magee, an expert in criminal law and a frequent critic and commentator on police and justice issues, has allegedly run afoul of the law herself.

Magee, 46, of St. Paul, has been charged in Ramsey County District Court with 11 felony charges of state income-tax evasion, including failure to pay taxes, failure to file tax returns and filing a false or fraudulent tax return, during the tax years 2004-2007.

According to the criminal complaint, a Minnesota Department of Revenue investigation found that Magee filed her Minnesota income-tax return on time only once in the period from 1991 to 2003 and that she failed to timely file returns for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007.

In those four years, Magee's wages from Hamline University ranged from $86,872.83 to $112,217.51 a year, according to the complaint.

The amount of taxes owed to the state for 2004-2007, not including penalty and interest, was estimated at $4,938, according to the complaint.

When Magee did file returns, she omitted interest, dividend, capital gains and pension income in the years of 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2003, the complaint says.

The complaint also says Magee claimed eight exemptions on her W-4 form, even though she is single and has no dependents.

Magee could not be reached for comment Wednesday.

Magee told Revenue Department staff that she has due refunds from overpaid taxes.

But Revenue Department records showed that Magee owed taxes most years, according to the complaint.

On Nov. 25, 2008, Magee faxed a message to the Revenue Department saying she would submit her 2004-2007 returns in a week to 10 days, according to the complaint.

The Revenue Department received faxed copies of Magee's 2004 and 2005 returns Jan. 15 and the 2006 return Feb. 23, according to the complaint. But the returns failed to report income from capital gains, dividend and interest and claimed unsubstantiated business expenses that had been previously disallowed, the complaint said.

The complaint states that the 2007 return remains unfiled.

The charges filed against Magee allege she failed to file tax returns in a timely manner and failed to pay taxes owed for the tax years of 2004-2007. She is also charged with filing a false or fraudulent tax return for the tax years of 2004, 2005 and 2006 because of failure to report income and because of falsely claimed losses from previously disallowed business expenses.

Phillip Prokopowicz, chief deputy attorney in the Dakota County attorney's office, which is handling the case, said he is not aware of any investigation of Magee for federal tax evasion.

The Dakota County attorney's office is handling the case instead of the Ramsey County attorney's office because of a potential conflict of interest because Magee has been a critic of the handling of criminal cases in Ramsey County.

For example, in an opinion piece that appeared in the Pioneer Press in 2007, she criticized the handling of allegations that a juror in the trial of the man accused of killing St. Paul police Sgt. Gerald Vick made racist statements.

The opinion piece sparked angry responses from St. Paul police.

Over the years, Magee has been frequently quoted in newspaper stories about criminal issues and has written opinion pieces on topics including the Rodney King verdict, the O.J. Simpson trial and Tasers carried by St. Paul police in schools.

According to her Web site biography, she was involved in the Committee Seeking Equal Justice for the Minnesota Eight, a support group for the defendants charged with the murders of Minneapolis police officer Jerome Haaf, a Minneapolis police officer who was ambushed by members of a street gang and shot to death on a coffee break in 1992, and Vice Lords member Ed Harris, who was seen talking to Minneapolis police investigators about the Haaf slaying.

A law review article by Magee cited in the bio is called, "The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt."

The bio also includes a quote from Magee that reads: "I believe, as the founders of this country espoused, that the greatest threat to law and order, peace and liberty is tyranny, not crime. I, therefore, believe that the highest calling of the lawyer is the call to fight against tyranny and government-sponsored or tolerated oppression."

Hamline University spokeswoman Jacqui Getty said Magee is teaching a criminal-law class and a race and law seminar this fall.

Of the tax evasion charges, Getty said, "We feel that this is a personal issue and it wouldn't be appropriate for us to comment on this at this time."

Richard Chin can be reached at 651-228-5560worked at Hamline University for 17 years as a law professor but is not familiar

Amanda Bonnen and The $50K Tweet - - Law and Daily Life

2009-07-30T12:19:00.001-07:00

Amanda Bonnen and The $50K Tweet - - Law and Daily Life

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Cammarano,Elwell,NJ Mayors Corruption

2009-07-23T13:53:00.000-07:00

On The Waterfront: Hoboken, Secaucus Mayors Arrested Along with Brooklyn Rabbis

By Joel Zand on July 23, 2009 11:58 AM No TrackBacks

Peter Cammarano, III, the Hoboken, New Jersey Mayor (inset, left and center), and Dennis Elwell, Mayor of Secaucus, New Jersey (inset, right), face high-level political corruption charges, along with more than 40 other people who were also charged with crimes ranging from corruption, extortion, money laundering, illegal money transmitting, to conspiracy to transport human organs.

Cammarano was allegedly caught by the FBI on tape in June telling a government cooperating witness, Solomon Dwek, "I stopped being a lawyer last month, um, hopefully for good." The FBI allegedly recorded a conversation that the Hoboken Mayor had with Dwek in a Hoboken diner where Cammarano is said to have conspired to extort $5,000 from Dwek, and bragged before his election that "[r]ight now, the Italians, the Hispanics, the seniors are locked down. Nothing can change that now. . . . I could be, uh, indicted, and I'm still gonna win 85 to 95 percent of those populations."

You can read these and other fascinating allegations of political corruption in the federal charges here:

The list of more than forty defendants accused in the charges spans a wide variety of individuals in New Jersey and New York. They range from New Jersey local and state politicians and officials, to a number of Rabbis in Brooklyn.

You can read the names of other accused individuals here:

According to the Asbury Park Press, the government's reputed cooperating witness is believed to be Solomon Dwek (inset, left), who was arrested and charged with federal bank fraud in May 2006 after passing a bad check of more than $25 million at a PNC Bank branch in Asbury Park, New Jersey.

He is said to have posed as a real estate developer for the FBI and allegedly tried to bribe from New Jersey officials to see if they would be willing to engage in criminal wrongdoing while in office.

You can read Dwek's original 2006 bank fraud criminal charges here:

Related Resources:

JohnFinley Obit C2-97-1370 Grand Jury MS609.43

2009-06-03T10:08:00.000-07:00

AFFIANTS: DISCLAIMER: 1989 WHEN John Finley was a Lawyer Ramsey Co. Commissioner, he Authored the Resolution no "taking" our paid for HomeStead, when the Property taxes were Paid. triggering the Heinous Murder_Death_Disabilitys of Affiants 2nd Husband Cpl.JimAnderson exploiting his Korean War Disabilitys.USDist97-1258(Montgomerys)Abuse_Denial 1stREdress

http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/749/2440/1600/Buck&GunMS609.748_21Aug01%20002.jpg

1997 Finley was indicted by the Grand Jury with the Falsification of Tax Records with Mangini's Bar and Restaurant, years ago Finley was the Lawyer for Deihl Gustaphson.

http://www.angelfire.com/mn3/andersonadvocates/PDFedem2006/file6.pdf

page 19 is relevant

Up to and including 62cv09-1163 alleged Ramsey Co. Tax Delinquent, the county of Ramsey has selectiviley "taken" Homestead Credits from the Average Homeowners to inflate

their Salarys,Pensions for pecuniary gain, unjust enrichment on Death,Disabilitys,Disparagement of Titles...........Olmstead v. US GovLawbreaker MS 508.80Fraud_Penaltys

JR Homeless_17

Obituary

Legacy.com

John T. Finley

E-mail Visit Guest Book

Finley, Hon. John T. The Honorable John T. Finley, age 69, of St. Paul passed away unexpectedly on June 1, 2009. He was a loving husband, father and grandpa who had a smile and a laugh that lit up the world. Preceded in death by his parents, James E. (Ted) and Frances. Survived by his loving wife, Jackie; children Bridget (Rob) Layne, John C. (Molly Lynch), Michele (Mike) Laney; grandchildren, Anna and Michael Layne, Marie Finley, Shealyn and Kiera Laney; sisters, Marquita (John) O'Connor, Annette Ashton (Meg Bittersweet); brothers, Jim (Carol), Pat (Arlene), Kevin (Sally) and many loving nieces and nephews. Funeral Mass 10AM Saturday, June 6, Assumption Catholic Church, St. Paul. Visitation Friday, June 5 from 3PM-8PM at O'Halloran & Murphy, 575 South Snelling Avenue, St. Paul, 651-698-0796. Interment Resurrection Cemetery. Memorials to donor's choice.

What goes around Comes Around

Motion Vacate, Restraining Order Jesie Ventura

Other Fax's Ramsey County Attorney Susan Gaertner
tel: 651-266-3222 Fax: 651-266-3010 Office of the Ramsey County Attorney

State Attorney General Mike Hatch: 651-296-6196Fx:297-4193
http://www.ag.state.mn.us Bull U.S. Corporate Home Page

US Attorney Tom B. Heffelinger 612-664-5786 Fax:612-664-5606
Complaint John T. Finley . Ramsey County Recall Mike Hatch, Attorney General. C8-01-99 United States Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota
/s/Bill Dahn Candidate for St. Paul City Council Ward 2 Dated 9/3/03
/s/ Sharon "QuiTam" Anderson, shewolfeagle@aol.com,Attorney Pro Se/

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

C2-97-1370

In Re: Complaint Concerning The Honorable
John T. Finley, Ramsey County District Judge.

O R D E R

WHEREAS, by order of this court filed on August 26, 1997, the petition of the Board on Judicial Standards for an interim suspension with pay of the Honorable John T. Finley, was "denied at this time as premature;" and

WHEREAS, by letter to this court dated December 19, 1997, the Honorable John T. Finley now has requested a "voluntary administrative leave, with pay," until final resolution of pending criminal and disciplinary proceedings;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in furtherance of this court's inherent authority and responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial office, effectively immediately, the Honorable John T. Finley is placed on interim suspension with pay until final disposition of any pending criminal and disciplinary proceedings or until further order of this court. Rule 4(b), Rules on Board of Judicial Standards. See, e.g., In Re Kirby, 350 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1984) and In Re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979).

Dated: December 19, 1997

BY THE COURT:

A.M. Keith
Chief Justice

Jim Backstrom'sThreatening Dr. Susan Roe

2009-02-07T10:13:00.000-08:00

Subj:	Check out State board investigating lawyer's complaint against Dakota County
Date:	2/5/2009 9:26:58 A.M. Central Standard Time
From:	Sharon4Anderson
To:	DDA1MNUSA
CC:	nancylazaryan@gmail.com, leslie@lesliedavis.org

Click here: State board investigating lawyer's complaint against Dakota County Attorney Backstrom - TwinCities.com This is a must read

Home

State board investigating lawyer's complaint against Dakota County Attorney Backstrom

Lawyer: Pathologist felt threatened by Backstrom's e-mail

By Frederick Melo
fmelo@pioneerpress.com

Posted: 02/05/2009 12:01:00 AM CST

A Dakota County forensic pathologist on the verge of testifying for the defense in the Nicole Beecroft murder trial unexpectedly pulled out last November, with the trial under way. The attorney for the Oakdale teen later convicted of stabbing her newborn child to death claims the pathologist was spooked by a threatening e-mail from Dakota County Attorney Jim Backstrom.

Now, a state board is investigating a complaint alleging that Dakota County's chief prosecutor crossed the line into professional misconduct with the e-mail.

According to Beecroft's attorney, public defender Luke Stellpflug, the Nov. 5 e-mail indirectly threatened that Dr. Susan Roe and her boss, Dr. Lindsey Thomas, would lose their jobs if Roe testified as a defense witness in the Washington County case.

Backstrom, who is in Washington, D.C., on work-related matters, could not be reached for comment Wednesday, and a message left on his work phone and an e-mail were not immediately returned. Monica Jensen, a spokeswoman for Backstrom's office, said Wednesday that he would have limited comment except to deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

At the time of the Beecroft murder trial, Stellpflug and his associate, attorney Christine Funk, contracted Roe as an expert witness for the defense to take notes on trial statements made by medical experts for the prosecution and to testify on Beecroft's behalf.

After Roe pulled out, Beecroft's defense team had to rely on other doctors and expert witnesses

at trial, without success. On Dec. 1, a Washington County judge convicted the 19-year-old of first-degree murder for stabbing her newborn daughter with a steak knife more than 100 times.

Beecroft, who was 17 at the time of the April 2007 killing, was sentenced to life without parole, over the defense's objections that the infant might have been stillborn.

Stellpflug maintains that Backstrom's e-mail did more than just hurt the defense's case. He said it amounted to coercion — a form of witness tampering. And that's illegal, Stellpflug said.

The Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility is investigating a complaint against Backstrom pertaining to the Nov. 5 e-mail and two other e-mails he sent to Thomas, the appointed medical examiner for eight counties.

In at least one e-mail, Stellpflug claims that Backstrom told Thomas that if she and her employees continued to testify as expert witnesses for defense attorneys, he and Dakota County Sheriff Don Gudmundson would not support Thomas' reappointment as county coroner.

"The effect that Mr. Backstrom's e-mail had ... was concern for her continued employment," Stellpflug said.

Thomas and Roe are privately employed by the Regina Medical Center in Hastings but provide forensic services for Dakota County and neighboring counties. Thomas said Wednesday that the justice system depends on expert witnesses, and forensic experts are hard to come by.

Stellpflug said that on or about Nov. 10, he filed a motion with the judge in the Beecroft case, calling Backstrom's e-mails coercive. In a Nov. 12 e-mail, Back-strom allegedly contacted Stellpflug, Thomas and Washington County District Judge Mary Hannon to clarify and defend his previous messages, noting that he never expected Roe to withdraw from the trial. His first e-mail on the subject was sent in September.

Stellpflug said the complaint against Backstrom was filed with the lawyers board in late November or early December by State Public Defender John Stuart and Bill Ward, chief public defender for the 10th Judicial District, which includes Washington County. He said he contributed materials to the complaint and saw it briefly before it was submitted to the board.

Stellpflug was unable to provide copies of the e-mails. Calls to Stuart and Ward were not immediately returned Wednesday.

Thomas, however, confirmed she had received the three e-mails and confirmed their general content. She declined to provide copies of them to the Pioneer Press.

Patrick Burns, an assistant director with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, said complaints regarding attorney misconduct are kept confidential unless a board panel finds probable cause for public discipline. He would not provide copies of the complaint.

"All I can do is confirm that the matter is being investigated," Burns said.

The board can privately reprimand an attorney or petition the state Supreme Court to take public action.

Frederick Melo can be reached at 651-228-2172.

Sharon4Anderson AOL	Reply » Report Abuse Judge it! #24 56 min ago REad the Petition Backstroms Malfeasance,Misfeasance,Nonfea sance has been going on for over 20 years http://www.petitiononline.com/mbdiabe/petitio... http://www.angelfire.com/mn3/deadbydiabetes/N...
DDA Inver Grove Heights, MN	Reply » Report Abuse Judge it! #25 52 min ago Interesting. Is this the first time Backstrom threatened witnesses? See: http://www.MurderbyDiabetes.org

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Rule of Law Revlution by Marisa McQuilken

2008-12-04T06:57:00.000-08:00

AFGHANISTAN: A STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

The Realities of Reform
By Marisa McQuilken

Last year, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice enthusiastically launched the Public-Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan, a partnership with private law firms designed to put American lawyers in contact with their Afghan counterparts for rule-of-law training. Private firms have contributed $1.5 million in cash and services to the effort, but major obstacles lie on the road to success: The Afghan people are resisting Western-style rule of law reforms, Americans already on the ground in the country are protective of their turf, and the Partnership is still learning to grapple with the country's unique legal culture.

Sharons UTube

2007-04-15T11:04:00.000-07:00

Sharon Anderson - Ward 2

StPaulEDemocracy - 3 min - Mar 31, 2007 - (1 rating)

... Candidate statement from St. Paul E-Democracy. http://forums.e-democracy.org/stpaul/ ...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEUxxM3Vmc4

LyingLawyers-LarryCohen-GeorgeLatimer

2007-04-15T08:55:00.000-07:00

FOR 30 YEARS NOW THESE LYING-LAWYER-MAYOR-JUDGEs: violating Minn. Const. Art. III Separation of Powers

SharonVoteSupJudge2004 JRBuckLake

www.sharon4council.blogspot.com St Paul Election 2007 - E-Democracy

Ward 2

Dave Thune 651-224-4457 webmaster@thune2007.com

Sharon Anderson Sharon4Anderson@aol.com http://www.sharon4council.blogspot.com

YouTube Statement

The Bodies Politic: On the Mend www.twincities.com

More than 30 years after George Latimer followed Larry Cohen into the mayor's office in St. Paul, he's still on Cohen's trail.
These days, though, its at the Shalom Home nursing facility on Midway Parkway.
The Scoop went up there Wednesday afternoon to find two of the city's most renowned former mayors recuperating, just a few doors apart in the same wing of the home.
Latimer had a hip replaced last week and is sporting a pair of nifty blue shorts and dashing white support hose.
Cohen is recovering from a fall that resulted in a pretty serious head injury during the winter, although it didn't catch up to him until a Carribean vacation.
Both were in fairly fine fettle when we found them.
"I have a doctor's certification that my brain is in great shape," Cohen said, fingering a surgical scar on his scalp for effect. "You can't say that."
Cohen has lost some weight and we found him walking with a cane, but he went home briefly Wednesday to scope out his Highwood home with an eye toward going home soon.
Latimer, too, needs a little help getting around for the time being, and is using a walker for now. He, too, said he's hoping to go home in the next few days.
Latimer said the Shalom Home has plenty of authority on hand without him, anyway: Cohen is on the home's governing board. "He's the mayor around here," Latimer said.

Posted by cityhallscoop on April 11, 2007 at 11:04 PM Permalink

http://blogs.twincities.com/mt/mt-tb.cgi

ECF_Fedcases_91Elec_13, causing BernicePetersonDeath,Disabilitys,Disparagment:TaxsPd-DM-F9-1366_AffPredHaigJohn_97_

Sharon Scarrella Anderson campaigned for 2007 Attorney General from her Wheel Chair: when stalking by police 19Apr06 caused broken ankle

Martin A. Cole	Director
Patrick R. Burns	First Assistant Director 1500 Landmark Towers 345 St.Petr St.St.Paul,MN 55102-1218 651-296-3952 1-800-657-3601

Lying-Lawyers

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Excise the Bar and Its Members from Government

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MNCourts_Efile_Discrimination_Sharon4Anderson_AttorneyProSe

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Trilogy Impeachments Judges,Public Officials 1992 to 2009

California Court Management System Takes More Heat

MN_JudgeKathleenGearin_Conflicts

Dist. Attorney caught in sexting scandal says he's immune from lawsuits | Minneapolis and St. Paul | kare11.com

Wersal_Weasal4Justice_8thCir.Judicial Win

Rule of Law via Gary

PART A. Instituting Proceedings

PART B. Citation Procedures

PART B(1). Procedures When Citation Is Issued to Defendant

PART B(2). Procedures When Citation Filed

PART C. Procedures in Summary Cases When Complaint Filed

PART D. Arrest Procedures in Summary Cases

PART D(1). Arrests With a Warrant

PART D(2). Arrests Without a Warrant

PART E. General Procedures in Summary Cases

PART F. Procedures in Summary Cases for Appealing to Court of Common Pleas for Trial De Novo

PART G. Special Procedures in Summary Cases Under the Vehicle Code

Lawyering Suits_USSC

Posted by: "Jeff" trvlshpp@prodigy.net bunkky96

Tue Jul 6, 2010 3:13 am (PDT)

Judges Kathleen Gearin re-elected

Gearin re-elected to 2nd District leadership

Bob Bregory_ProsecutorObligations

Main Stream Media,Grass roots Rebirth,Corporate Hores

Robin K.Magee Hamline law_Tax Evasion

Hamline University law professor charged with state income-tax evasion

Amanda Bonnen and The $50K Tweet - - Law and Daily Life

Cammarano,Elwell,NJ Mayors Corruption

On The Waterfront: Hoboken, Secaucus Mayors Arrested Along with Brooklyn Rabbis

JohnFinley Obit C2-97-1370 Grand Jury MS609.43

Obituary

John T. Finley

Jim Backstrom'sThreatening Dr. Susan Roe

State board investigating lawyer's complaint against Dakota County Attorney Backstrom

Rule of Law Revlution by Marisa McQuilken

Sharons UTube

LyingLawyers-LarryCohen-GeorgeLatimer

FOR 30 YEARS NOW THESE LYING-LAWYER-MAYOR-JUDGEs: violating Minn. Const. Art. III Separation of Powers

Ward 2

The Bodies Politic: On the Mend www.twincities.com

ECF_Fedcases_91Elec_13, causing BernicePetersonDeath,Disabilitys,Disparagment:TaxsPd-DM-F9-1366_AffPredHaigJohn_97_